


ORIGINAL

Al6-3  
Serial 043



(10:cs)

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**SECRET**

U.S.S. ORMSEY  
(APA49)

REPORT OF ~~REDACTED~~ OPERATIONS ~~REDACTED~~  
~~REDACTED~~

To: Commander Task Force 53  
Via: (1) Commander Transport Division SIX  
(2) Commander Transport Division EIGHTEEN

**FILMED**

DECLASSIFIED - DOD DIR. 5200.9  
of 27 SEP 53  
BY 916 DATE 2.10.64



APA49/A16-3  
Serial 043

U.S.S. ORMSBY

(10:cs)

9 December 1943

SECRET

From: The Commanding Officer.  
To: The Commander Task Force Fifty Three.  
Via: (1) Commander Transport Division SIX.  
(2) Commander Transport Division EIGHTEEN.  
Subject: Operational Report Tarawa, Gilbert Islands,

1. On 22 October 1943 commenced loading troops and marine cargo at Wellington consisting of:

- (a) 5th Battalion, 10th Marines - less Battery "O" -  
27 officers - 372 enlisted men.
- (b) Detachments from:
  - (1) Signal Co. - 1 officer - 5 enlisted men.
  - (2) B Tanks - 2 officers - 40 enlisted men.
  - (3) Weapons Co.-6 - 2 officers - 50 enlisted men.
  - (4) B Medical - 1 officer - 14 enlisted men.
  - (5) Band - 10 enlisted men.
  - (6) M.P. - 8 enlisted men.
  - (7) Ordnance Co. - 4 enlisted men.
  - (8) Service and Supply - 14 enlisted men.
  - (9) Headquarters and Service-6 - 2 officers -  
40 enlisted men.
  - (10) 1-6 - 2 officers - 128 enlisted men.
  - (11) B-1-18 - 5 officers - 100 enlisted men.
  - (12) AmphTracBn - 1 officer - 28 enlisted men.
  - (13) Co. "A", Special Weapons Battalion - 2 officers  
- 74 enlisted men.
  - (14) Co. "E"-2-18 - 2 officers - 68 enlisted men.

TOTAL PERSONNEL - 47 officers - 956 enlisted men

TOTAL CARGO - 692 tons of cargo, total 25,800 cubic  
feet, and 63 vehicles.

These detachments were all a part of CT6; the bulk of the detachments were included in the LT1/6 shore party, 37 MM gun sections, tank crews, assault engineers, and collecting sections. These troops were considered the Corps Reserve and the vessel attached to Transport Division SIX, U.S.S. HARRIS flagship, with instructions to land troops and equipment as directed.

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9 December 1943

SECRET

Subject: Operational Report Tarawa, Gilbert Islands,  
[REDACTED]

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2. On 24 October 1943 vessel loaded and shifted to anchorage in Wellington Harbor - On 26 October 1943 vessel ran degaussing range and upon completion anchored in previous berth. From 24 October 1943 to 31 October 1943 troops were made acquainted with life and customs on board ship - held day and night exercises in boat drills, debarking and embarking boats, assembly and rendezvous, line of departure, and loading at the rail and from nets.

3. At 0815, 1 November 1943, got underway and proceeded in accordance with Operation Order 43 of Commander Transport Group (U.S.S. MONROVIA), and took station as previously assigned. Arriving off Pango Point, Efate Island at 0345, 7 November 1943, vessel operated in accordance with instructions during practice landings. At 0708 pilot on board and proceeded into anchorage at Fila Harbor, Efate. At 0500, 8 November 1943, set Condition IA, lowered all boats and conducted landing drill operations with U.S.S. FELAND; at 1000 received orders to get underway and stand out of harbor; at 1021 got underway and stood in towards beach; reloaded all troops and hoisted all boats, and proceeded in accordance with orders from Commander Transport Division SIX (U.S.S. HARRIS).

4. At 1350, 9 November 1943 moored alongside U.S.S. MILLICOMA in Havannah Harbor, Efate and fueled to capacity; shifted and anchored in assigned berth at 1644 same date.

5. At 1342, 13 November 1943 got underway in accordance with Commander Task Force 53 secret mailgram 112052 and took station as previously assigned.

6. At 0352, 20 November 1943 arrived in Transport Area Able off Tarawa, Gilbert Islands and maintained station as ordered. At 0516 fire support group commenced bombarding Helen Island. At 0603 shell fire from enemy batteries observed dropping near transports and moved out of area in accordance with orders from O.T.C. Returned to Transport Area Able at 0707 when enemy batteries ceased firing. At 1135 amphtrac 2-27 from LST243 was hoisted aboard which contained 3 dead, all of whom had died of gunshot and shrapnel wounds. They were properly prepared and buried at sea. Amphtrac was badly damaged by enemy shell fire, patches were welded on shell holes, engine and steering gear repaired, refueled and despatched to lagoon. Reports on other personnel casualties on attached list.

7. All casualties handled by using the unoccupied boom at No. 3 hatch by hoisting the boats to the rail and wounded men immediately taken to sick bay. In this connection it is noted that the ORMSBY sick bay capacity is 32, and the troop officer's dining room and the forward troop compartment on second deck were utilized as sick bay spaces. Casualties were received daily and given the best of attention.



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Subject: Operational Report Tarawa, Gilbert Islands,

8. At 1655, 21 November 1943 ordered to land tanks and 37MM guns and assault engineers on Green Beach. The 37MM guns were unable to land and returned to ship at 2150. At 2140 orders were received to land tanks on Red Two instead of Green Beach.

9. At 0730, 22 November 1943 resumed loading tanks and 37MM guns which were then ordered to land at Green Beach. At 1045 closed Green Beach and dropped anchor under foot, and began debarkation of shore and beach party in conjunction with U.S.S. PELAND. Ordered to unload all small arms, rations, and water which was completed at 1830 same day. Orders were also received to land collecting and military police section, which was accomplished. All boats in running condition were despatched to PURSUIT when not used by this vessel.

10. At 0431, 23 November 1943 got underway and stood out of Transport Area Baker in accordance with O.T.C. instruction. Returned and anchored off Green Beach at 0655, awaiting instruction to land what would be requested from the beach. At 1435 got underway and left Transport Area in accordance with instructions from O.T.C.

11. At 0640, 24 November 1943 returned to Transport Area Able. At 1300 ordered to land water distillation equipment and the remaining personnel of B-18 on Diana. CRMSBY beach and shore party were then transferred from Green Beach to Diana to assist in unloading U.S.S. VIRGO and THUBAN. At 1430 transferred 38 casualties to U.S.S. MONROVIA for further disposition. At 1825 got underway and stood out of Transport Area on orders from O.T.C.

12. At 1545, 25 November 1943 returned to Transport Area Able and debarked remainder of H and S-6. At 1753 got underway and stood out of Transport Area on orders from O.T.C.

13. At 0720, 26 November 1943 returned to Transport Area Able. At 1329 got underway and proceeded out of Transport Area in accordance with instructions from O.T.C.

14. At 0728, 27 November 1943 returned to Transport Area Able. Ordered to transfer Apamama boat pool and equipment to U.S.S. J. FRANKLIN BELL. Transferred 2 LCM(3)'s, all boat pool personnel and equipment and Argus unit to U.S.S. J. FRANKLIN BELL. Inquired from BELL if they would also take 2 LCP(R)'s and 1 LCVP for Apamama boat pool which was answered in the negative. At 1045 in obedience to instructions dispatched all boats to beach to re-embark 700 troops. At 1334, commenced re-embarking troops and equipment.



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Serial 043

U.S.S. ORMSBY

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9 December 1943.

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Subject: Operational Report, Tarawa, Gilbert Island,  
[REDACTED]

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15. At 0600, 28 November 1943 sent 15 boats to ELIA beach to re-embark troops, part of which were then ordered to DIANA beach. At 1325, took on board 7 enemy prisoners. At 1405, all troops on board, hoisted all boats, took on board 48 officers and 745 enlisted men. While in lagoon, boat pool requested exchange of 5 broken down boats for 5 good running boats; this was done. ORMSBY boat #11 was left stranded on beach due to low water; boat in excellent condition. LST in vicinity requested to float boat at high water and turn over to boat pool. At 1433, got underway and stood out of lagoon and joined other vessels in Transport Area. At 1745 in accordance with instructions, got underway in formation and proceeded to Pearl Harbor. Arrived Pearl Harbor at 1500, 7 December 1943.

16. At 1700, 7 December 1943 transferred 46 casualties to hospital, Pearl Harbor, and 7 prisoners. Refueled and took on board approximately 100 tons of machine equipment, 26 vehicles, and 3 officers, 213 enlisted men for further transportation to Hilo.

17. At 1630, 8 December 1943 got underway in company with U.S.S. FELAND, O.T.C. and U.S.S. ASHLAND and stood out of harbor bound for Hilo.

18. Arrived off Hilo at 1130, 9 December 1943, but was unable to enter because of no available berth; entered and anchored inside breakwater at 1530, requested docking, but was directed to remain at anchor due to weather conditions. Pilot on board at 0730, 10 December 1943, and moored to berth three, Hilo at 0800. Commenced discharging cargo at 0800.

*Leonard Frisco*  
LEONARD FRISCO  
Commander D-M USNR  
Commanding.



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INDEX TO ADDENDA

Additional remarks, general notes and recommendations  
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List of Prisoners  
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List of cargo unloaded, Tarawa  
List of boats, disposition  
List of dead, buried at sea  
List of casualties transferred to U.S.S. MONROVIA  
List of casualties transferred to hospital, Pearl Harbor



#### ADDITIONAL REMARKS

1. The most difficulty encountered in conduction of these operations from the troop and cargo standpoint was in the receipt and coordination of information relative to debarkation and embarkation. Messages were received from the 2nd Marine Division to land LT 1-6 personnel three days after they were disembarked and two reports were sent stating that fact.
2. Ship reported, on request, that it could embark 700 men at Tarawa and then received orders to embark 48 officers and 745 enlisted men, in addition to casualties. Orders were to embark personnel from Diana Island, and the troops were actually located on Ellat Island. This unit embarked with organizational combat gear, including 20 - 75MM pack howitzers. In order to load all rolling stock as requested it was necessary to eliminate all bunks from platform decks. This vessel was ordered to crowd troops on board when reloading at Longsuit; this was done although a number of vessels sailed with very few troops and equipment, all of whom could have loaded troops since they were in the vicinity of the ORMSBY.
3. Argus Air Warning Unit (1 officer - 10 enlisted men) was embarked at Efate. This unit was to be a part of Apamama garrison. No orders were received to disembark this unit; however information was requested from 2nd Marine Division, U.S.S. J. FRANKLIN BELL, and U.S.S. FELAND as to their disposition. Neither of these addressees gave any instructions. The commanding officer, ORMSBY transferred this unit to BELL on his own responsibility prior to sailing of BELL for Apamama.
4. It is believed that boats and not amptracs should be used in evacuating casualties from beaches to ships, and that casualties be so arranged in boats so that the entire boat can be picked up at the rail and wounded taken to sick bay. This is particularly important during night hours. ORMSBY boats all carried out these instructions and are so fitted to hoist either by boom or at the davits. A considerable number of boats from other vessels neither could be hoisted by boom or at davits due to slings having been missing in some cases, and other, the slings were in bilges of boats under the stretchers.
5. For the first 6 nights after D day, boats were scattered as far as ten miles at sea. All of these were interfering with the maneuvering of transports while leaving and entering transport area. Although, no doubt, all coxswains had been instructed to remain inside lagoon when not employed.
6. One ORMSBY LCM loaded with a full load of 6 inch pipe from the U.S.S. JUPITER remained so loaded for three days; it was necessary to recall this tank lighter, discharge pipe on deck, repair same, and transfer to U.S.S. J. FRANKLIN BELL for further transfer to Apamama boat pool. This pipe remained on deck for two days before another tank lighter could be obtained to transfer pipe to beach.
7. All boats from other vessels were repaired, fueled, and crews fed day and night.



8. The U.S.S. ORMSBY, at the time of the Gilbert Operations, had been in commission less than five months, with approximately 75 percent of the officers and enlisted men who have never been to sea. The total amphibious training consisted of approximately three weeks. A rigorous training program was developed and carried out prior to and after commissioning. The commanding officer feels that while no officer or man performed beyond the call of duty of a man o' warman in time of war, that the officers and crew of the ORMSBY gave their all in keeping with the finest traditions of the U.S. Navy; nothing was too hard or difficult for them to perform, and in comparison with the veteran ships in amphibious training, performed their duties equally as well. The commanding officer considers this excellent accomplishment due to continuous training and practical application.

*Leonard Frisco.*  
LEONARD FRISCO,  
Commander D-M USNR  
Commanding.



COMMENTS FROM Lt.(jg) T.M. ANDERSON, BEACH  
OFFICER, U.S.S. ORMSBY, [REDACTED] OPERATIONS

1. The beach party from the ORMSBY landed on Green Beach North on 22 November 1943 at 1300. The FELAND beach party was already established there having been present the previous day and coming back at 0800, 22 November 1943.

2. The FELAND and the HEYWOOD control boats were present guiding the various boats in and out of the channel, around the protruding coral heads, to the beach. It was approximately high tide at this time.

3. When we arrived, the beach was about thirty-five to forty yards long with two broken down tanks obstructing a part of this. The distance from high water to the berm and gun emplacements varied from six to twenty-five yards. Four dead Japs and one dead marine were in the immediate vicinity of the beach and one Jap was floating against the barbed wire at the right flank of the opened beach. This one was removed and buried immediately by the beach party in order that the beach length could be extended.

4. The ORMSBY boats landed the 1/6 Shore Party under the command of Captain Branson, USMC. They immediately stowed their packs and turned to unloading boats. The beach party from ORMSBY stowed their gear and set up about 75 yards to the right of the FELAND beach party. They then commenced to widen the beach to the right by removing barbed wire strung on posts about fifty yards from high water line. The left flank was defined by gun emplacements, a latrine built out over the water, and barbed wire; all of which hindered or rather prohibited the widening of the beach to the left. A first aid station was established 50 yards to the left of the left beach flank marker and another close to the right marker.

5. On orders from FELAND Beach master and the suggestion of the Shore Party Commander, the ORMSBY medical section of the beach party was secured to the ship, it being felt that they would be of far more value on board than on the beach in view of the prevailing circumstances. Casualties were to be treated by marine and FELAND corpsmen and dispatched to the ships immediately as there was no place to establish a collection center.

6. Cargo was unloaded on the beach until 1545 at which time water receded fast and three LCV's with wire in their screws, one LCM with a damaged rudder which made it less maneuverable and three LCV's that were heavily loaded were left stranded. The loaded boats were unloaded by the use of rubber boats (brought to the beach by the FELAND assault troops on 21 November) and two LVT's that were available at this time. The cargo was stacked on the beach in a very unordered fashion because we strived to get as many boats unloaded as possible before the tide caused us to quit.

7. The boats that were stranded were able to retract at about 2230, and loaded boats commenced to come in shortly after this



8. On 23 November loaded boats were called in by flash lights and unloaded until ebbing tide made it impossible at about 0345. Boats with heavy equipment and supplies from the DOYEN, LA SALLE, HARRIS, BELL, LEE, MIDDLETON, FELAND, ORMSBY, and others were unloaded on this beach by the 1/6 Shore Party. One boat from the FELAND loaded with personnel was left stranded at ebbing tide because the coxswain failed to follow flash light signals directing him in to the beach. At 0415, 23 November, Condition Red was set and enemy planes approached Helen Island. At 0430 Green Beach was bombed and strafed. Three casualties (marine) resulted about 75 yards to the left of us. These casualties were cared for immediately by navy and marine corpsmen. At dawn the all clear signal was sounded. At 0630 while manning rubber boats to evacuate the casualties resulting from the bombing and from an amphibious tractor that exploded when it hit a mine at the S.W. point of the island, COOKS, J.B., Sic, ORMSBY and a marine 50 yards away were struck by shrapnel from an exploding mortar projectile. All injured were taken immediately via rubber boats to LCV's in deeper water and transferred to FELAND and ORMSBY. Three marines who lost their lives in the explosion of the amphib blast were taken from the water nearby the accident at daylight and given burial during the morning as were some of the others nearby. A marine working party also disposed of the dead Japs on the beach in the vicinity as well as some which floated by during the day close into shore.

9. At 1230, 23 November the DOWN beach party landed and at 1700 they secured. During the time they were there we were able to get the beach cleared of cargo. One reason for this was our being able to use their portable loudspeaker to get all hands available to work most efficiently. Very little cargo was unloaded on Green Beach after 1630, 23 November 1943.

10. From the time we landed on Green Beach until 1630, 23 November snipers' rifles were continuously cracking and the shells could be heard whizzing by over our heads. Occasionally a mortar shell could be heard going over and detonating. On the afternoon of 23 November seventy prisoners, mostly Korean laborers, were taken prisoner in this vicinity; the majority within a range of 150 yards of our bivouac area where approximately 3000 marines had holed up the night before among cases of shells, TNT, grenades, gasoline, water, and rations in an area 25 yards by 300 yards. The prisoners were placed in their own bomb proof shelters and guarded until the next day when they were taken aboard some of the ships.

11. At 0005, 24 November Condition Red was again set and the enemy planes could be heard ranging from one end of the Island to the other dropping bombs here and there. They bombed Green Beach again this night about 0400, but there was no casualty.

12. About 1000, 24 November Captain Branson received orders from Col. COOK and Lt. Comdr. FABIAN (head beach master) to move the Shore Party 1/6 and the FELAND and ORMSBY beach parties less their medical section to Yellow Beach One, on Diana Island, during high tide that afternoon.



13. All but 120 marines of LT 1/6 Shore Party and the radiomen of the ORMSBY beach party and ORMSBY Beach Master left for Diana at 1430 from Green Beach. Those remaining were ordered to the pier at Red Beach Two by Commodore McGOVERN for loading, and they were to take the available tractors and amphib's. On arrival at Red Beach Two an air raid was in progress and as a result we were unable to load out the personnel until 1910 and were not able to load the tractors at all. The first contingent of the Shore Party arrived at Diana during high tide; established on Yellow Beach Two because of more favorable unloading conditions. The balance of the Shore Party arrived at 0035, 25 November on Yellow Beach One and holed up for the night without encountering sentry or other person. At daylight we moved 2000 yards eastward and met up with the rest of our party.

14. We had three amphib's and rubber boats that we had brought with us from Green Beach and immediately started unloading boats during low tide. In a reconnaissance of the island we decided to establish a beach 2000 yards east of Yellow Beach Two because of more favorable unloading condition for LST's coming in to the Island. The HARRY LEE beach party was also on this island and set up on Yellow Two.

15. Cargo which included medical jeeps, trucks, 105's, gas, water, rations, burlap bags, wire, etc. was sent to this beach for unloading. Some of the coxswains of the boats reported that they had their load on as much as three days and had not been allowed to unload it at Helen or Cora Islands because they didn't want it there. It appeared as if the ships wanted to get their holds emptied in a hurry but the marines didn't know what to do with so large an amount of cargo on such a limited area as the islands provided. During the high tide we were able to get LST's as well as LCM's and LCV's into the beach for unloading. We were hampered here again by the lack of sufficient personnel in the Shore Party to unload the boats. About 1600 an additional fifty men arrived from Helen Island to augment the number that we had. At 1130 the FELAND beach party secured from the Island. At 1645 ORMSBY beach party received orders to secure from Commodore McGOVERN. We immediately packed and were ready to secure at 1715 except for two men we could not locate. We secured without them and they showed up on board the ORMSBY the next morning. We reported to the Commodore for further orders and were sent to the VIRGO to spend the night. The VIRGO treated us in true Navy fashion and at 0900 26 November 1943 we were ordered back to our own ship. At 1130 we reported aboard.

16. The Shore Party 1/6 functioned exceptionally well. Their work was of the hardest manual type as all equipment and cargo landed had to be unloaded and placed in the dumps by hand. Conditions did not warrant the use of trucks or tractors. They all gave their best. Captain BRANSON had the Shore Party well organized, but even so there were insufficient personnel. There was seldom 120 men available at one time for unloading purposes. The type of beaches encountered here demands a larger shore party, especially during low tide.



17. The supply of fresh drinking water was not the best in as much as cans previously used for paint, diesel oil, gasoline and kerosene were filled with drinking water which became undrinkable. Many canteens filled with this sort of water could not be used when needed. Conservation of water on the beach was noticeable.

18. The communication with the TBY radio was found to be ineffective because of the fact that it varies frequencies so easily and can not be used when there is any obstruction between sender and receiver. The TEX radio worked fine. It is necessary that the TEX and TBY operators be given more schooling on the operational circuits and frequencies used so that better communications can be maintained. Communications between beaches was very poor during this operation. Inter-beach communication between Red Beach Two and Green Beach by telephone was not established until 24 November and then not until the Shore Party Commander went to Division Headquarters at Red Beach and inquired about it. Communication to the various beaches on Diana was established on 25 November soon after getting the beaches located, and had telephone and TEX service.

19. The boat crews from all ships who landed gear on beaches Green and Yellow performed in a commendable fashion and especially so considering the type of beaches on which they operated. Boat crews unloaded their own boats in some instances on Diana where we were short of marine working personnel. There was only one case that came to my attention of a member of a boat crew leaving his boat without permission to do so. That was Edward T. WHITE, Cox. of a PA16 boat. He was absent from his boat for about thirty minutes and as there was no engineer in the boat, the deck hand had to wait for the coxswain to return before pulling away from the beach.

20. The FELAND and ORMSBY beach parties performed their duties in a most creditable way, doing a great deal more work than is actually set forth under FTP211. After establishing and marking the beaches the hydrographic and boat repair parties helped unload the boats; carrying the supplies to the various dumps and also worked diligently and pushed rubber boats loaded with casualties for as much as a mile from shore over the coral reefs in order to expedite delivery to the ships.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Only one beach party to be sent to each beach.
2. That the shore party be a larger unit. It should have a minimum of three hundred men with no drafting of the same for other purposes once the beach is secured.
3. That portable electric amplifiers be made available for the beach master, salvage boat, and control boat of those ships not already having them.
4. Some type of radio better than TBY be used.
5. That radio and signal men be sent in boat with boat officer when there is a time element involved and when there is a large number of boats being used. (Reembarkation, etc.)



6. That water cans be used exclusively for that purpose and painted with unmistakable marking known to all hands.
7. That the control boat belonging to the ship which has the beach party on shore function for that beach with an officer controlling the traffic.
8. That better plans be made as to what equipment should be unloaded and to which beach it should be directed.

#### MEDICAL REPORT OF ACTIVITIES DURING [REDACTED] OPERATIONS

1. A total of 94 casualties were received on board. Ten were buried at sea, 38 were transferred to the U.S.S. MONROVIA for later transfer to Hospital Ship, and 46 were brought to Pearl Harbor for transfer to the U.S. Naval Hospital, Pearl Harbor, T.H. The list of these casualties is included elsewhere in this report.

2. It is felt that the wounded could be given more adequate care if they were distributed among the ships present instead of arriving sporadically and in large numbers. The majority of the casualties received on this ship came within the short space of a few hours and overtaxed the capacity of the department. The sick bay capacity of 32 including 4 in the insane ward was overtaxed and the troop officers' mess was converted and the most serious cases were handled there. Eight of the beds in the sick bay are top beds in tiers three high and it is impossible to get seriously wounded men into these eight beds. The doors of the main ward are located in such a narrow passage that it was impossible to carry stretchers through them. This is being corrected.

3. The forward troop compartment was used for less seriously injured cases. This is located on the second deck in the forward end of the ship.

4. It is felt that there was too much delay in getting the injured men to hospitals.

5. There were 36 transfusions of whole blood and approximately the same number of plasma units administered. One case of gas gangrene occurred and it required all of the gangrene gas anti-toxin on board for that one case.

6. It is felt that an additional gas gangrene anti-toxin and combined tetanus and gas gangrene anti-toxin should be furnished if it is available.

7. Very few wounds were sutured except those that were incision like in nature, and it is believed that the best results are obtained by packing the wounds when it is indicated after treating them with sulfathiazole powder. A few wounds which were sutured had to be later re-opened.

8. The medical part of the beach party was ashore only a short time because at the particular beach on which they landed their services were not needed and there was an acute shortage of help aboard.



COMMENTS OF COMMUNICATION OFFICER, Lt. (jg) A.H. DARLING

1. During the entire ~~operation~~ Operation communication from and to this vessel functioned satisfactorily in all channels. At no time was difficulty encountered due to failure of equipment. Due to limited facilities, especially on the signal bridge, it was difficult to maintain the pace set after 22 November. An effort will be made to procure additional equipment which should relieve this situation.

2. Despite repeated warnings by the Task Group Commanders, the TBS circuit was overcrowded with non-tactical traffic, most of which could have been sent by visual means. For administrative work more use of the transport common frequency is also recommended. Obviously the voice circuit is more convenient and faster, but it must be reserved for tactical and emergency orders.

3. The truck and shackle codes are quick and simple means of conveying signals but there was some confusion at first regarding the time of change for the shackle. This should be clearly stated prior to commencing operations; for conformity, G.C.T. is preferable.

4. Flag hoist signals for routine cargo and boat reports is commendable and should be encouraged for other similar reports whenever practical.

5. During operations where TBY equipment was used in salvage and control boats, it was found advisable to have at least two spare batteries in the boat at all times. With this arrangement at no time was there failure due to equipment. However, in future operations, some boat radio equipment designated for use off the boat's electrical system and installed permanently, would be much more practical.

6. The TBX is the best field equipment found. No trouble of any kind was experienced with it, and it was the one positive communication link between ship and shore. The TBY with the beach master was fine for communication with boats, but because of range limitations and physical obstruction it was not heard consistently at the ship.

7. Operators on all field circuits should be capable of handling traffic on both voice and CW. The sending of long messages on any circuit in a voice channel is impractical in several respects, necessity of spelling phonetically similar words and possibility of misunderstanding by the receiver or mispronunciation by the sending operator. Tactical and emergency signals should always be in voice channel for quicker promulgation to action officers.



