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# SECRET

U.S.S. ORMSBY  
(APA49)

REPORT OF FLINTLOCK OPERATIONS  
MARSHALL ISLANDS

To: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.  
Via: (1) The Commander Transport Division FOUR.  
(2) The Commander Transport Division EIGHTEEN.  
(3) The Commander FIFTH Amphibious Force.  
(4) The Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

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8 February 1944

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From: The Commanding Officer.  
To: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.  
Via: (1) The Commander Transport Division FOUR.  
(2) The Commander Transport Division EIGHTEEN.  
(3) The Commander FIFTH Amphibious Force.  
(4) The Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: Operational Report (Flintlock) KAWAJALEIN, Marshall Islands.

Reference: (a) Commander Task Force FIFTY-TWO Operation Order A6-43.

Enclosures: ✓ (A) Comments and Recommendations of Commanding Officer. *P. 5*  
✓ (B) Comments and Recommendations of Executive Officer. *P. 6*  
✓ (C) Comments and Recommendations of Beachmaster. *P. 9*  
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1. Cargo was loaded on 9 January 1944, a total of 469 tons as listed on Enclosure "J". On 21 January 1944, loaded troops of the 7th Infantry Division, U.S. Army, Commanding Officer, Lt. Col. A.V. HARTL. The following troops were taken on board: 7th Infantry Division, BLT 17-1 - total - 70 officers and 1348 enlisted men. These troops were considered the Advance Transport Unit, and the vessel was attached to Transport Division FOUR (Temporary), Task Unit 52.5.11, Captain J.B. McGOVERN, USN, U.S.S. ZEILIN, flagship.

2. A demolition outfit was loaded consisting of six officers and thirty-eight enlisted men, four boats, and all gear, ammunition and equipment. Two officers and twelve enlisted men reported with LCC39 which was taken aboard. On 22 January 1944, Captain R.C. LEE, DE-V(G), USNR and Captain L.A. JOHNSON, USA, reported as observers; Lt. Comdr. G.H. HEYEN, RANR(S) reported for duty in connection with hydrographic unit. At 1251, 22 January 1944, got underway and stood out of Pearl Harbor in accordance with instructions. At 1504, joined U.S.S. ZEILIN, division flagship. At 1650, joined cruising formation with Task Force 52, U.S.S. ROCKY MOUNT, flagship, and maneuvered as directed enroute to Transport Area, Flintlock, Marshall Islands.



3. Daily maneuvers were held as directed by OTC, and drills were held on board daily. Conferences and instructions were conducted both for troops and ship's company, including the commanding officer and crew of LCC39. Drills and instructions were held daily as follows: first aid, damage control, gunnery, gas masks, smoke boat officers and crew, beach party officers and crew, communication instruction, all boat crews, troop debarkation drills in accordance with schedule, models and blackboard instructions for all boat crews, boat officers, control, salvage, and hydrographic boats, guide boats, LCC39, and all other officers and men, both army and ship's company connected with debarking troops and the subsequent landing of troops on beach.

4. 28 January 1944 - Transferred three officers and one enlisted man, part of demolition crew, to U.S.S. MONROVIA. At 1715, formed approach disposition with Advance Transport Unit, U.S.S. ROCKY MOUNT, guide.

5. 31 January 1944 - At 0500, set Condition IA. At 0524, commenced rail debarkation of troops. At 0543, received orders to "land landing force". On orders from Commander Transport Division FOUR, Commander G.W. McCORMICK, D-M, USNR, Executive Officer was sent to line of departure to dispatch waves. At 0545, arrived at Troop Transfer Area I Able. At 0549, started lowering all boats and formed in waves. Number three and four waves formed off port bow and number one and two waves formed off port quarter. At 0635, LST242 arrived and loaded the third and fourth waves. Completed at 0720, and proceeded towards line of departure, Beach White Two. At 0650, LST272 arrived and loaded the first and second waves. Completed at 0725, and proceeded towards line of departure. At 0735, sixth wave left for line of departure. At 0802, fifth wave of tank lighters left for line of departure. At 0825, seventh wave left for line of departure. At 0854, eighth wave left for line of departure. H hour changed from 0830 to 0910. At 0914, got underway and shifted to Transport Area One. At 1145, ordered to land all stores and equipment, and commenced closing in towards Beach White Two. Ordered to send four boats to PRESIDENT POLK - at 1542 ordered to send six boats to PRESIDENT POLK. Boats were dispatched as they became available. At 1725, ordered by Commander Transport Division FOUR to enter lagoon, and anchored in C-22 at 1838. Continued discharging until 2400, when beachmaster advised not to send any more boats due to tide conditions. At 2015, dispatched five LCVP's and one LCM to PRESIDENT POLK.

6. 1 February 1944 - At 0600, send Chief Carpenter E.E. SCHULTZ, USN with gear and equipment to repair pier at Carlos Beach. Additional gear and equipment were dispatched for making repairs to pier as requested and as boats were available. At 0900, received orders from Commander Transport Division FOUR to discontinue loading and make boats available for special mission. All boats available were dispatched to Carlson Beach on order from Commander Transport Division FOUR. At 1130, ordered to discontinue sending boats to Carlson Beach; requested to continue discharging as boats became available, and answered in the affirmative.

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Late afternoon received two LCM's and two more at midnight to expedite discharging. Information was received that ORMSBY boats number 9, 16, and 18, used by PRESIDENT POLK, were stranded on Carlson Beach. Salvage party was sent to attempt salvage of same. ORMSBY boat number 17 was also stranded on Cecil Island after a trip for the burial of twenty Japanese dead. This boat was refloated and returned to ship at 2330 for repairs. Demolition boat number 13 was reported sunk off Carlos Beach due to hole in bottom. Crew had attempted to return to ship for repairs, but was unable, and boat sank between Carlos and anchorage C-22; crew was rescued.

7. 2 February 1944 - Continued working cargo all night. At 1200, conference of commanding officers on ZEILIN regarding landing troops on Burton Island, Beach Orange Four. Demolition boats, all equipment and explosives left ship for Beach Red. At 1600, finished discharging cargo on Carlos Island, Beach White One. On instructions from Commander Transport Division FOUR, 25 pallets of 105mm ammunition were discharged on Carlson Island. At 1612, commenced loading troops for operations on Burton Island. At 1700, salvage parties returned with stranded boats number 16 and 18 from Carlson Beach. Boat number 9 sank in deep water, and was unable to recover. At 1824, finished loading troops and equipment. Total troops embarked - 500. Fueled U.S.S. SIGSBEE during the night.

8. 3 February 1944 - At 0545, set Condition IA. At 0607, commenced loading troops in boats. At 0625, command to lower all boats. At 0701, all boats in water for operations, Burton Island. At 0712, all troops away and waves formed following LST's 224, 272, and 242 as previously planned - Y hour 0930. First wave reported landing at 0934 - all ORMSBY troops - waves 1, 2, 3, 7, 8, 9, and 10 reported landed at 1055. At 1400, transferred ship's platoon to Carlos Island as instructed. At 1730, transferred boat pool personnel, equipment, and four boats for KWAJALEIN Boat Pool to U.S.S. BELLGROVE as instructed. Fueled U.S.S. MURRAY. Transferred four casualties to U.S.S. RELIEF. All boats returned during the night, hoisted same in preparation for departure from Flintlock Area. At 1800 beach party at Carlos Island relieved, and returned to ship.

9. 4 February 1944 - At 0930, got underway in company with U.S.S. ZEILIN, flagship, Task Unit 52.19.1, U.S.S. WINDSOR, and U.S.S. VIRGO and proceeded to Funafuti, as previously directed. End of (Flintlock) Marshall Islands operations.

*Leonard Frisco*  
LEONARD FRISCO,  
Comdr. D-M USNR,  
Commanding.



COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF COMMANDING OFFICER

(a) The ORMSBY was in the Advance Transport Unit and one of the two assault ships. During this operation, the ORMSBY carried one LCC and four demolition boats. From all observations, both Beach White One and Two were very poor beaches for landing craft, and boat repair department worked continuously. As a matter of record, 66 landing craft were hoisted and repair made to struts, skags, rudders, ramps, hulls, and propellers.

(b) More LCM(3)'s would be a great help in expediting discharging. The shortage of landing craft resulted in crews standing by at hatches continuously for 58 hours and the heaviest hatch actual discharging time was 12 hours and 45 minutes. The commanding officer strongly recommends that more LCM's be carried by all vessels since they can perform the same function as the LCVP's, can carry more cargo and can retract from beach landings with little or no damage, and handle better alongside in a choppy sea. Also, one LCM(3) can carry three times as much personnel and cargo with a crew of four men as three LCVP's with a total of nine men.

(c) Except for long, continuous hours of hard, conscientious work with little or no sleep, the commanding officer does not consider that anyone on the ORMSBY performed beyond the call of duty. For their hard and loyal, conscientious work on the beach, a notation will be made on the fitness reports of Commander G.W. McCORMICK, D-M, USNR, and Lt(jg) T.M. ANDERSON, D-V(G), USNR, Beachmaster. For the excellent work performed on board ship on boat repairs a notation will be made on the fitness reports of Lt. J.F. THORNEBERRY, E-M, USNR, Chief Carpenter E.E. SCHULTZ, USN, and Carpenter O.I. WIRT, USN, and Lt. E.B. NICKEL, D-V(G), USNR for the efficient handling of troops in debarkation. A notation on the records of all enlisted men connected with the above, including boat crews, will also be made. The commanding officer considers the ORMSBY performance as a whole very good and in keeping with the best traditions of the U.S. Navy. The long hours of conscientious, loyal, and highly efficient service, the days and nights of conferences and the drills performed by the officers and crew paid off in the successful results of the actual landings.

*Leonard Frisco*  
LEONARD FRISCO,  
Commander, D-M, USNR,  
Commanding.



Comments of Commander George W. McCormick,  
covering the landing operations on Carlos Island,  
Kwajalein Atoll, February first and second 1944.

1. In accordance with instructions from COMTRANSDIV FOUR this officer landed on Carlos Island Pier at 0720, first February 1944, and assumed charge of all beach activities. From a personal survey of the lagoon side of the island and the pier made the day before it had already been concluded that the only safe landing area for boats was in the vicinity of the pier and that the pier itself was not suitable for operation in it's present incomplete state.

2. The hydrographic party from the ORMSBY made a survey of the beach and as a result it was decided to land boats along the beach for a distance of one hundred yards to the northward of the pier and about twenty yards to the southward of the pier. The control boat had rounded up all landing craft lying to in the lagoon and supplies and equipment were started ashore. The dock was surveyed, material and men ordered from the ships in the lagoon and work started. The dock was decked over at the seaward end and repaired elsewhere as needed. An old wooden boom on the seaward side was rigged, a power winch dragged out from the beach and rigged and the entire dock completed and in service at 1430.

3. Difficulty was experienced in handling cargo, especially pallets, until trucks and dozers were obtained, even then, the work was slow as all cargo had to be dragged through heavy sand to dumps that were in some places five hundred yards away. At one period, two hours and fifteen minutes were required to discharge an LCM3 load of pallets. Later, with more dozers, the same amount was taken out in forty five minutes.

4. Two boats, usually LCM3's were beached to the southward of the pier and at times as many as eight boats of both types were beached to the northward. Boats were docked on both sides of the pier and when sea conditions permitted, on the seaward side. Net loads were generally discharged by hand at the pier and then loaded into trucks that were backed down on the dock. Pallets were broken and discharged in the same manner. Each truck as it left the dock dragged astern from one to three pallets which had been lifted from boats at the seaward end by the boom. At times, boats with net loads were beached and trucks backed down to the ramp and loaded by hand. However, it was found necessary to drag the trucks up the beach with dozers, the sand being too loose and deep for them to obtain traction. This was also found necessary in the case of vehicles as small as jeeps. Owing to the small number of tractors, five at the most, and lack of men, only a portion of all boats beached or docked could be worked at one time. It was estimated that not over one hundred and fifty men were available at any one time.



5. It was found that the wire beach matting did not work out very well on this beach and was unsuitable for ordinary two and a half ton trucks. It is suggested that experiments be made with the type of material that is used on landing strips and if found successful it be laid on loose sandy beaches in order that trucks be backed down to the water's edge and loaded by hand from the boats.

6. Considerable difficulty was experienced at times in unloading both pallets and nets from LCVPs. Unless the boat was squarely in the beach and the nets and pallets loaded just so, there was a tendency for the drafts to foul the ramp wires or catch the sides of the boat in way of the ramp opening. Such discharging was very slow.

7. The LCVPs were not found to be as suitable as the LCM3s. They do not take the ground as well, cant to one side or the other when aground and could not be dragged off except dead astern. Any side wise movement was very bad for the skegs and the exposed rudder, and wheel. LCM3s were dragged off from any angle, in some cases being turned completely around and pulled off bow first, the stern pivoting in deeper water. It is recommended that wherever possible, LCVPs be replaced by LCM3s. One of the latter will carry more than three of the former, either in cargo or troops, with the added advantage of requiring only four men against the nine required by three LCVPs. They handle much better on the beach and alongside the ship and can take more punishment at either place. On the present operation they could land on any stage of the tide that the LCVF could. Considerable saving of time could be effected as with one LCM3 there would be just the one operation of coming alongside and leaving the ship, landing and retracting, while with LCVPs there would be two additional movements to carry less cargo or troops.

8. More bull dozers and trucks should be made available. With a large movement of material and equipment, dumps and depots must be set up at some distance from the landing area in order to avoid congestion. To overcome loss of time, at least two dozers or two trucks should be made available for each boat that can be landed at one time. Even with a dump only five hundred yards away, there is quite a lapse of time between the moment when the draft leaves the boat until the prime mover returns for another load. The boat in the meantime lies idle with another waiting off the beach to take it's place.

9. There is an urgent need of a properly designed salvage boat. The present type is not suited for this kind of work. A twin screw boat, with protected rudder and wheel, strong heavy stern with a good grip on the water and with suitable posts and cleats, is strongly recommended for each ship.

10. One or more bull dozers on each beach should be fitted with a padded shoulder or ram to be used in shoving boats off the beach.



## COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

OF LT(JG) T.M. ANDERSON

BEACHMASTER, U.S.S. ORMSBY

1. The hydrographic and communication sections of the U.S.S. ORMSBY and a ten man detail from the Army Shore Party embarked in two LCVP guide boats of the fourth wave and transferred to LVT's from the fourth wave 1000 yards to seaward and to the left of the SC539 which was acting as a control vessel for dispatching the waves at the line of departure to White Beach Two on Carlos Island. As soon as the third wave was dispatched, this party followed it to the beach, arriving at 0930 on Beach White Two.

2. Hydrographic soundings and observations were made to mark a channel or roadway which might be used at all states of the tide for the unloading of vehicles and cargo. The hydrographic section searched the entire shoreline, but could not find a channel that was adequate for beaching boats all stages of the tide. The pier on the lagoon side of the Island was in a bad state of repair and would require several hours work in order to be usable. During high tide there was approximately  $6\frac{1}{2}$  feet of water at the seaward end of the pier. During low tide two LCM's could be landed between the Jap vessel grounded to the left of the pier and the pier. Four LCM's or eight LCVP's could be unloaded at a time to the right of the pier.

3. White Beach Two was wide enough to handle about eight boats at a time on a 300 yard frontage, but could only be used during the interim of  $2\frac{1}{2}$  hours preceeding and  $2\frac{1}{2}$  hours succceeding high tide. The beach was of hard coral, steep with some jagged rocks jutting out at the waters edge. The hydrographic section felt this the best beach on which to unload cargo while the ships were to seaward.

4. Lt.Col. HARTL, commanding officer of BLT 17-1 ordered all remaining waves dispatched to the beach, and they arrived as follows: LCM's carrying tanks landed at 1025, fifth wave (LVT's called in after tanks in LCM's) 1030, sixth wave 1035, 7th wave 1040, 8th wave 1046, bulldozers 1210. All eight waves were able to beach their boats before grounding. At 1210, the tide was ebbing and the LCM's carrying the bulldozers grounded approximately 100 yards from shore.

5. About 1400, Commander McCORMICK, Executive Officer of the U.S.S. ORMSBY surveyed the seaward coastline and the lagoon side as far as the pier and could find no beach more suitable than Beach White Two for present operations and advised CTD4 as to present conditions. At this time there was considerable surf on the lagoon side. The short sandy beach near the pier and the pier itself was the only place which gave any promise at all for unloading on the lagoon side.



6. After 1500, the troops from the U.S.S. WINDSOR commenced landing on Beach White Two by transferring from LCPV's to LVT's. The WINDSOR beach party landed at 1515 and set up on Beach White Two, but only stayed approximately three hours until it secured and moved to the pier in the lagoon from which it operated until D plus one at which time it was ordered to Carlson Island for operations.

7. At 1830, boats were again able to land on Beach White Two and all boats present were unloaded. The last one was unloaded at 2340 at which time CTDA was notified.

8. At 0700, D plus one, Lt. BUNCHMON, U.S. Army, and myself walked to the pier to see what the condition were. Upon arriving at the pier on the lagoon side of the Island we could see Commander McCORMICK with two other officers and some enlisted personnel were making preparation to recondition the pier. I was ordered to remain there and take charge of the beach so immediately ordered the remainder of the Beach Party to secure from Beach White Two and join me at the pier.

9. The personnel sent to assist in reconditioning the pier did a fine job, working unceasingly until the job was completed. Chief Carpenter E.E. SCHULTZ from the U.S.S. ORMSBY, the carpenter from the U.S.S. ZEILIN, and Chief Boatswain's Mate ATWELL from the WINDSOR did a fine job in supervising the repair and getting the boom at the end of the pier in condition to hoist pallets and not cargo from the boats at all stages of the tide.

10. By 1100, the pier was being used to some extent, and by 1500 it was being used fully. We were then fixed so that we could unload seven boats at a time onto the pier. Two trucks were backed onto the pier, the cargo unloaded from LCPV's and LCM's by hand and placed in them. When the truck nearest the boom drove from the pier it not only took its normal load but dragged from one to three pallets with it that had been hoisted onto the pier from boats at the end of the pier by the use of the boom. In addition to using the pier for unloading, we were getting from six to eight boats to the beach at a time.

11. We received word at 1522 on D plus two that we were to start reembarking troops at 1530. The first troops arrived and were boated at 1610. We used all available boats for this purpose and completed clearing the pier of troops at 1910. This used all available empty boats so we commenced unloading boats of cargo and reloading with vehicles for the various ships. This went on until approximately 0100, D plus 3, before we had the last of the equipment loaded and on its way to the ships.

12. At 2145, orders were received to secure the hydrographic section of the beach party and have them report on board to get ready for operation on Burton Island.

13. After the equipment was sent from shore we unloaded boats from the MONROVIA and then the BELL until 0400, D plus 2.



About daylight LCT's started pulling in for unloading on shore at either side of the pier. Trucks were able to drive into them without difficulty and unloading proceeded. The first LCT landed broached and was not able to retract until after 1300. The others did not have this trouble. At about 1600, the ORMSBY beach party was relieved and secured from the beach and reported back on board at 1700.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

The following are recommendations that I wish to make which might prove helpful in future operations.

1. That five gallon cans be used for transporting water in place of 50 gallon barrels.
2. That a minimum of two tractors, dozers, or trucks be available for each boat that can be beached at one time. These are needed for keeping the beaches cleared and dragging cargo from the boats.
3. That a larger number of men be allocated to the unloading detail on the beach. We found that because of a lack of tractors and the distance to the dumps, it was necessary to break many of the pallets, load the boxes in trucks by hand and haul them to the inland dumps. Whenever cargo has to be manhandled the number of men in the working party should be twice as large as the Army has thus far allowed. A total of 180 men is allowed and used only for discharging on the beach and no other duties.
4. That each boat be loaded with cargo of the same type, i.e., all pallets or all slings. Mixed loads require a longer time for unloading.
5. That each landing team provide at least one winch and preferably two that may be used by the shore party in unloading operations.

*T.M. Anderson*  
T.M. ANDERSON,  
Lt.(jg), D-V(G), USNR,  
Beachmaster, U.S.S. ORMSBY.



COMMENTS OF LT. A.H. DARLING - COMMUNICATION OFFICER

1. In view of the great amount of traffic necessary and the number of circuits manned in a task as extensive as Flintlock, it can be said that communications aboard this ship functioned very satisfactorily and with a minimum of confusion under the circumstances. At no time was there a failure due either to equipment or personnel which speaks well for both.

2. Many lessons learned in past operations were used to good advantage, the most noticeable being the decreased use of the TBS circuit. As a parallel to the TBS the TCO (2716) functioned admirably for handling administrative traffic and proved itself a valuable addition to our equipment. The 608 installation was also a godsend in enabling us to establish communication on voice circuits not required to be constantly manned. In this connection it should be mentioned that more use of the TCO could be made for ship to ship traffic which was transmitted on the 608 and 610 circuits. This would help to clear these channels for necessary and immediate instructions to all boats.

3. It is regrettable that each transport could not have a private ship to shore frequency, especially for the boats. The transport division common was overcrowded resulting in violation of circuit discipline most of the time.

4. The use of flag hoists for making routine reports again proved of inestimable value and was augmented this time by the addition of the medical report which was given twice daily instead of every six hours. We strongly recommend that this practice be continued in future operations as an aid in relieving congested voice circuits, and that other reports be added to the list where practicable.

5. A good share of the traffic on ship to ship voice circuits could have been transmitted by visual means during daylight hours and this point should be more vigorously stressed in future plans. The fact that voice circuits are fast and convenient is the very reason they should be reserved for urgent and important traffic.

CONCLUSION:

Even though Flintlock required a more complicated communication plan than Galvanic, it may be stated for the edification of all concerned that performance was smoother and results more satisfactory. Perfection may not be attainable, but at least a noticeable advancement has been made toward that goal.

*A.H. Darling*  
A.H. DARLING,  
Lt., C-V(S), USNR,  
Communication Officer.

(Enclosure E)

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*A.H. Darling*  
A.H. DARLING,  
Lt., C-V(S), USNR,  
Communication Officer.

(Enclosure E)

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TIME STUDY OF FLINTLOCK OPERATIONS

31 January 1944 - D - Day

BOAT AND WAVE DEBARKATION

0500 - Set Condition IA.  
0524 - Called away boat teams #s 101-103-104-108-109-31-32-34.  
0526 - First team loaded in boats at rail debarkation.  
0529 - Called away boat teams #s 102-105-106-33-41-42.  
0538 - Called away boat teams #s 107-35-43-44-45-53.  
0543 - Received order to land "Landing Force."  
0549 - Gave command to lower all boats.  
0550 - First boat hit the water and left the ship.  
0604 - Gave command to drop all nets.  
0610 - First complete wave left the ship.  
0616 - First team was at net debarkation station.  
0619 - Called away boat teams #s 110-51-61-62-63-71.  
0638 - Called away boat team #86.  
0658 - First boat returned to ship after transferring LVT teams to LST.  
0710 - Called away boat teams #s 52-72-73-81-82-83-85-84-88.  
0729 - Called away boat team #87. This was the last boat team.  
0854 - All troops debarked. Total of 1182 enlisted men and 66 officers.

TIMES FOR WAVE DEBARKATION WAS AS FOLLOWS:

1st wave left ship at 0656.  
2nd wave left ship at 0656.  
3rd wave left ship at 0610.  
4th wave left ship at 0653.  
5th wave left ship at 0746 and left for line of departure at 0802.  
6th wave left ship at 0735 and left for line of departure at 0735.  
7th wave left ship at 0825 and left for line of departure at 0825.  
8th wave left ship at 0854 and left for line of departure at 0854.

The last davit boat hit water at 0622. Total time elapsed from Condition IA to last davit boat to hit water was 1 hour and 22 minutes. Total time elapsed from command to lower all boats and last davit boat hit water was 33 minutes.

The first and second waves were embarked in LST272 at 0725 - LST272 left for line of departure.

The third and fourth waves were embarked in LST242 at 0720 - LST242 left for line of departure.

THE WAVES LEFT FOR BEACH WHITE TWO AS FOLLOWS:

1st wave left line of departure at 0850.  
2nd wave left line of departure at 0852.  
3rd wave left line of departure at 0854.  
4th wave on call.  
5th wave on call.  
6th wave on call.  
7th wave on call.  
8th wave on call.

(Enclosure F)



THE WAVES HIT BEACH WHITE TWO AS FOLLOWS:

1st wave hit beach at 0911.  
2nd wave hit beach at 0915.  
3rd wave hit beach at 0925.  
4th wave hit beach at 1030.  
5th wave hit beach at 1010.  
6th wave hit beach at 1035.  
7th wave hit beach at 1040.  
8th wave hit beach at 1046.