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SECRET

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U.S.S. ORMSBY (APA49)

REPORT OF GUAM OPERATION

To: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) The Commander Task Group 53.4.
(2) The Commander Task Group 53.2.
(3) The Commander Task Force 53.
(4) The Commander Task Force 51.
(5) The Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

DIST: 250 copies to CTG 53.4.

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APAA9/A16-3
Serial 0061

U.S.S. ORMSBY (APAA9)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, Calif.

(10:cs)

S-E-C-R-E-T

SECRET

28 July 1944.

From: The Commanding Officer.
To: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) The Commander Task Group 53.4.
(2) The Commander Task Group 53.2.
(3) The Commander Task Force 53.
(4) The Commander Task Force 51.
(5) The Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: Operations Report - AGAT, GUAM. (2 June - 5 Aug 1944)

References: (a) ComTaskForce 51 Operation Plan A10-44.
(b) ComTaskForce 53 Operation Plan A162-44.
(c) ComTaskGroup 53.2 Movement Order A4-44.
(d) ComTaskGroup 53.2 Movement Order A6-44.
(e) ComTaskGroup 53.4 Landing Attack Order 11-44.
(f) ComTaskGroup 53.2 Attack Order A3-44.

Enclosures: ✓(A) Comments of Commanding Officer. - p.7
✓(B) Comments of Beachmaster. - p.9
✓(C) Comments of Medical Officer. - p.11
✓(D) Comments of Communication Officer. - p.14
✓(E) Troop Units Carried. - p.16
✓(F) Cargo Stowage Plan. - p.17
✓(G) Time Study of Loading and Unloading. - p.18
✓(H) Time Study of Operations - WILLIAM Day. - p.21
✓(I) Prisoners of War. - p.22
✓(J) Casualties. - p.23
✓(K) Report of Lt(jg) Weston M. ALT, D-V(G), USNR
of LCC21439 attached to U.S.S. ORMSBY. - p.42

1. 2 June 1944 - At 0917, U.S.S. ORMSBY arrived and anchored in berth 154, TABSAFARONGA, for the purpose of loading small parcels of cargo not already loaded and to embark troops for the forthcoming operation. At 1230, commenced loading cargo; at 1720, shifted anchorage to berth 129.

2. 3 June 1944 - At 0650, got underway and shifted to berth 150; at 0730, lowered boats and despatched to beach 23 to load troops; first boat load of troops alongside at 0801. At 1315, completed loading troops and equipment and shifted to berth 129. Troops on board listed on enclosure (E), cargo and equipment listed on enclosure (F).

3. 4 June 1944 - At 0800, got underway on signal (O.F.C., CTG 53.2 (GEORGE CLYMER); Guide, CTG 53.4 (ZEILIN) and formed cruising disposition 2C. The following drills, exercises, and

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maneuvers, by O.T.C. were held daily enroute: recognition of ships and aircraft, instructions to boat crews, beach and hydrographic parties; signal drills; conferences for all officers regarding coming operations; instructions to all boat officers; damage control, general drills, and gunnery drills; and daily maneuvers by O.T.C. of entire formation. Ammunition expended during passage: 11 rounds 5"/38, 380 rounds 20mm, 80 rounds 1.1/75.

4. 8 June 1944 - At 1509, arrived KWAJALEIN and anchored in berth assigned; replenished fuel and provisions. Held conferences of all officers, schools for all boat crews, beach and hydrographic parties.

5. 12 June 1944 - At 0837, got underway on signal with CGF 53.2 (GEORGE CLYMER, flagship) and proceeded as directed. At 0952, cleared GEA PASS and formed cruising disposition 10; ZEILIN guide. At 1306, held general quarters - gunnery and damage control drills. Ammunition expended: 20 rounds 5"/38, 1240 rounds 20mm, 320 rounds 1.1/75. At 1516, secured from all drills.

6. 15 June 1944 - At 1430, fueled U.S.S. MURRAY at speed of 12 knots. Completed fueling MURRAY at 1745; delivered 37,380 gallons of fuel oil; left fueling area and rejoined formation.

7. 17 June 1944 - WILLIAM Day was postponed until further orders and maneuvered in operating areas as specified by O.T.C.

8. 28 June 1944 - At 0840, approached U.S.S. MARIAS close aboard and received tow line in preparation for fueling. At 0855, six-inch fuel oil hose on board; at 0906, commenced receiving fuel; speed of exercise - 9 knots. At 1004, finished fueling, received 2289 barrels of bunker fuel. At 1023, all lines and hoses disconnected and rejoined formation.

9. 30 June 1944 - At 0803, U.S.S. McDONOUGH came alongside to receive 130 cases of tobacco rations and 35 cases of toilet articles for further transfer to tractor group - speed of both ships during transfer - 13 knots. At 0825, completed discharging tobacco and toilet articles; McDONOUGH let go breast line and proceeded. At 1600, proceeded in company with CGF 53.2 towards ENIWETOK.

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10. 3 July 1944 - At 1627, arrived ENIWETOK and anchored berth 358. At 1925, got underway and moored alongside U.S.S. MANILENO for fuel.

11. 4 July 1944 - At 0035, completed fueling; at 0601 got underway and proceeded towards berth 874, northern anchorages, ENIWETOK. Anchored in berth 874 at 0726.

12. During the voyage conducted maneuvers as directed by O.T.C. and held drills and exercised daily in the following: damage control, drills during routine general quarters, aircraft recognition classes, boat coxswain instruction, beach party instruction, and first aid instruction. Exercised troops at debarkation stations every second day and held daily physical exercises.

13. During stay at ENIWETOK, from 4 July 1944 to 16 July 1944, vessel fueled, provisioned, sent recreation parties of both crew and troops ashore, and held daily drills.

14. 17 July 1944 - At 1124, got underway in accordance with CTG 53.2 Movement Order A6-44, and in company with CTG 53.2 formed cruising disposition enroute to objective.

15. 20 July 1944 - At 0618, U.S.S. PRESTON approached off ORMSBY port side for fueling; at 0626, commenced pumping fuel to PRESTON; speed of exercise 12.5 knots. At 0848, completed fueling. Delivered 34,272 gallons bunker fuel; at 0856, PRESTON cast off and resumed former position in formation.

16. 21 July 1944 - At 0530, set Condition IA; at 0615, arrived in Transport Area off AGAT BEACH, GUAM; at 0630, ordered to "land landing force." Commenced lowering all boats and disembarking troops. At 0632, despatched 8 guide boats to LST for LVT assault troops. At 0634, SC 1328 alongside and picked up Commander G.W. McCORMICK, D-M, USNR, Executive Officer U.S.S. ORMSBY, designated as Transport Group Beachmaster. At 0650, commenced discharging combat cargo and equipment; at 0655, all boats in water; at 0704, seventh wave despatched for line of departure; at 0801, eighth wave despatched for line of departure; all first trip of boats loaded and away. H hour - 0830. At 0924, commenced debarking troops for second trip of boats. At 1006, second trip of boats completed and despatched to line of departure. At 1130, LCC21439, attached to U.S.S. ORMSBY returned badly damaged by enemy shell fire while employed in surveying beaches. It was sent to U.S.S. CARTER HALL

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for emergency bottom repairs. Following named officer and men attached to LCC21439 were killed in action: Lt(jg) R.P. ARNOLD, D-V(G), USNR, COGLIANESE, F.J., Seaman first class, USNR, and WALCH, G.J., Coxswain, USNR. At 1525, commenced discharging 8" naval ammunition into LCT 966. Continued discharging during the night as boats became available.

17. 22 July 1944 - At 0200, completed discharging 8" naval ammunition into LCT 966. At 0918, received one enemy shell hit well above water line between frames two and three, sheer strake, at port bow, anchor windlass resistor housing. Shell appeared to come from vicinity of Point FACPI; shell pierced hull and exploded making a hole approximately 12 inches in diameter; no other damage noted; no casualties. Hole in port bow was immediately made water tight by welded patch. Immediately after shell struck port bow the forward magazine flood valves were opened. After observing that shell struck well above the water line and forward of magazine, the magazine flood valves were closed. Magazine was immediately pumped dry. At 0930, commenced receiving enemy prisoners of war. Received five enemy prisoners; continued discharging during the day and night.

18. 23 July 1944 - At 0815, completed discharging all cargo; at 1007, all troops disembarked. In accordance with CTF 53 despatch 221427 of July transferred five prisoners of war with marine guard and Japanese language officer, Ensign A.R. DORNHEIM, I-V(S), USNR to U.S.S. PRESIDENT POLK at 1022. At 1310, transferred boat pool personnel (unit of boat pool #16, one officer and 12 enlisted men), three ORMSBY LCVP's, four smoke generators and fog oil to GEORGE CLYMER in accordance with instructions from CTG 53.4. At 1325, commenced receiving casualties from ZEILIN, PRESIDENT POLK, and from AGAT BEACH. At 1445, ORMSBY Beach Party relieved by CTD 38 and returned to ship. At 1715, got underway in company with CTD 6, FAYETTE, and retired out of Transport Area for the night.

19. 24 July 1944 - At 0640, returned to Transport Area off AGAT BEACH. At 0800, transferred 159 smoke pots and 221 smoke floats in ZEILIN boats for further delivery to LST476. ORMSBY tanklighter returned to ship; all ship's boats accounted for. At 1315, transferred two gasoline winches to Beach Yellow Two as ordered by Group Beachmaster. At 1640, got underway

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with CTD 6, FAYETTE, and retired out of Transport Area for the night.

20. 25 July 1944 - At 0622, returned to Transport Area off AGAT BEACH. At 0710, made preparations to receive destroyer alongside for the transfer of 5"/38 ammunition. At 1156, U.S.S. JOHNSTON moored alongside and at 1203, commenced transferring ammunition. At 1255, finished transferring ammunition and stores to JOHNSTON who unmoored and proceeded; delivered to JOHNSTON 407 rounds of 5"/38 powder, 90 rounds of 5"/38 star shells and 317 rounds 5"/38 projectiles, also a quantity of fresh and dry provisions. Received from JOHNSTON a quantity of empty powder cans for further delivery. Transferred to GEORGE CLYMER all available blood plasma, stretchers, and blankets not required for return voyage to rear area. Continued receiving casualties. Total number on board shown on enclosure (J). At 1400, got underway in company with CTU 53.15.1, U.S.S. FAYETTE and proceeded out of GUAM Transport Area for ENIWETOK.

21. 29 July 1944 - At 0841, anchored in berth 217 ENIWETOK with Task Unit 53.15.1. At 0855, U.S.S. MONAGHAN moored alongside for fuel and stores. At 1442, MONAGHAN unmoored from alongside. Delivered to MONAGHAN fresh stores, provisions, and 1529 barrels of fuel oil. At 1500, transferred seven serious eye-cases to hospital ENIWETOK.

22. 30 July 1944 - At 0850, got underway in company with CTU 57.16.14, Captain Brittain, U.S.S. FAYETTE and formed cruising formation, bound South Pacific Area.

23. 5 August 1944 - At 1009, anchored in berth 15, Segoe Channel, Espiritu Santo, New Hebrides. At 1457, commenced transferring casualties; at 1547, finished transferring all casualties to hospital Espiritu Santo.

Leonard Frisco
LEONARD FRISCO,
Captain D-M USNR,
Commanding.

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COMMENTS OF COMMANDING OFFICER

1. The operation was executed in accordance with existing plans and instructions. From the viewpoint of the commanding officer the entire operation appeared to be well-planned, efficiently executed, and operation plans were so prepared that every detail was covered leaving no doubt as to the particular task to be performed by the commanding officer and the personnel under his command.

2. The daily debarkation drills, the sincere cooperation of the Commanding Officer and officers of the troops resulted in a smooth and efficient debarkation schedule, which enabled the ship's officers to debark boat waves in record time as fast as boats became available. The daily conferences of boat officers and boat crews enabled the eight guide boats of LVT waves to be immediately despatched upon arrival at the Transport Area without further instructions, performing their duties with the utmost efficiency.

3. The operation and reliability of our landing craft and its crews was everything to be desired. All boats operated at their highest efficiency with only minor damages, all of which was immediately repaired by ship's force; at no time was a damaged boat held up for repairs for more than twenty minutes.

4. The LCC21439, attached to the ORMSBY, was badly damaged by enemy shell fire during the first phase of the operation while surveying the reef as instructed after leading the first LVT wave. Shell struck port side of cockpit outside of bulwark, demolishing the entire bulwark and caused a large hole on deck and amidships watertight compartment. Shrapnel from this shell sheared all wires to odograph, radar equipment, fathometer and all lighting circuits; also caused damages throughout the amidship parts of the boat. All damages are being repaired by ship's force.

5. The cargo discharge went off smoothly and efficiently. The aid of one LCT, several LCM's and pontoon barges from other sources contributed greatly to the expedition manner in which cargo was despatched. It is highly recommended that more of this type of craft be employed in the future amphibious operations. Since the ORMSBY only carried one LCM, it can be readily seen the tremendous assistance this type of craft afforded in discharging large mobile equipment. All cargo gear operated to our complete satisfaction.

6. The officers and crew of the ORMSBY are to be commended for their loyal, efficient, sincere, and tireless efforts performed day and night, which in their small way, as one organized unit, contributed to the success of a large and difficult amphibious operation.

LEONARD FRISCO
Captain D-M USNR
Commanding.

Enclosure (A)

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COMMENTS OF BEACHMASTER

1. Beach Party was boated in three sections: a reconnaissance-communication section consisting of the Beachmaster, one signalman, two radiomen and five seamen from the hydrographic section with SCR 610 radio, TBX radio, 536 radio portable light and generator and some other necessary gear; a secondary group with assistant Beachmaster and remainder of communication and hydrographic sections and remainder of their equipment; and a third group consisting of medical and repair sections with their equipment.

2. Reconnaissance section was taken to LST 482 for transfer to reserve LVT. However, none was available. Two reserve LVT's with orders to follow in the sixth wave on Beach White Two were found in LST 227 and one of these was used. This LVT was launched at 0732 and proceeded to follow LVT's of sixth wave which formed in good order and crossed line of departure at 0820. Boat with second section of beach party acted as left flank guide boat for sixth wave. LVT with first section passed through some artillery and small arms fire and arrived at 0848, to the right of center of Beach White Two. It was noted that sixth wave for this beach and apparently some of previous waves were being forced too far to right, so that left flank landed in center of beach and some LVT's for White One were landing on left half of White Two. This beach was bad for landing of any vehicles at high tide with almost no smooth strip and much blocky coral. Almost entire left half of beach could not be used at all. Extreme right flank was heavily strewn with large mines and one LVT was destroyed by one of these in early stage of landing. Shore party defused some to clear lane for tanks. Others were marked with beach party danger signs as were also two unexploded bombs.

3. Although delayed by confusion of LVT's and firing, a suitable location for radios was found just to left of center of beach in front of some pill boxes and all radios were operating and making proper contacts at 0905. Seamen of first section at once prepared a sand-bagged hole for protection of radios into which the equipment was moved without cessation of operation.

4. Upon arrival of sixth wave on edge of reef hydrographic party, in second section, began making a survey of reef edge and top. Some tanks and tractors did not wait for survey, however, and three tanks were swamped by dropping into pot holes before usable roadway was found and marked with steel depth gauges and flags. This roadway which was down right flank of beach was satisfactory for almost all vehicles at low tide and tanks and some larger tractors and trucks could still use it at high tide. It was smooth and hard all the way. Even jeeps could get over it without swamping at low tide if towed in one or two at a time by loaded LVT's or DUKW's.

5. At no stage of the tide could LCVP's or LCM's cross over the wide reef edge and come into the beach with load. Many LCVP's were stuck on the reef edge and were pulled off by salvage boat. None were lost on this beach.

6. Within a reasonable length of time the beach was ready to receive cargo and working parties were taken from the shore party for LVT's. Cargo moved at an excellent rate and at 1530 a 50-ton ammunition barge reached the reef edge. This was unloaded during the night and it then became a fuel barge. Two LST's arrived the second day and were unloaded. Two more followed these and were unloaded.

7. The only stoppage of work on Beach White Two occurred as follows: (a) From 0400 to 0600, on 22 July when there was a sharp counter attack by the enemy who destroyed one small dump of demolition explosives at 0415 with mortar fire and destroyed two vehicles at 0430 when enemy hand grenade detonated a pile of twenty-two enemy land mines which had been cleared from the beach. The enemy who penetrated to the unloading area were eliminated at once except for six snipers who were dug out in the vicinity of beach party radio later in the day. (b) From 0001 to 0430, 23 July due to orders to all troops from their commanding officers to stop during that time.

8. The beach party was ordered to move to Beach Yellow Two at 1100, 23 July and were secured and ordered to return to the ORMSEY at 1300 that day.

9. The medical section landed at 1100, 21 July and operated continuously until relieved on 23 July. They treated and evacuated a total of 152 casualties, 35 stretcher and 67 ambulatory.

10. Difficulties of note that were encountered may be listed as follows: There was not enough fuel on beach early enough for continued operation of LVT's. LVT drivers had not been instructed to take orders from beachmaster or shore party commander and their own officers were too few to properly direct LVT traffic. It is believed that beachmasters and shore party commanders should be given more actual and literal control over LVT and DUKW traffic with better liason with officers in charge of vehicles.

O.R. IHRGANG,
LtCdr D-V(G), USNR
Beachmaster

Enclosure (B)

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COMMENTS OF SENIOR MEDICAL OFFICER

1. A problem of conserving diminishing supplies was present on this ship as it probably was on other ships. This was largely due to the unexpected length of time that troops remained on board, and was particularly true of Atabrine. Additional amounts were obtained. It was necessary, however, to borrow from the Marine's supply which was replaced.

2. It is felt that we were very fortunate in having avoided an outbreak of contagious disease such as dysentery, with troops on board so long.

3. The Sick Bay however, had many cases of recurrent malaria to handle. This was undoubtedly due to the negligence of the Marines in taking Atabrine. The majority of such patients admitted that they had not taken Atabrine when it was given them.

4. This ship was designated as a "prisoner of war" ship and began functioning as such. Five Japanese prisoners were accepted and all of them received medical attention. Four had multiple shrapnel wounds, mostly of several days duration and showed no evidence of adequate first aid except that given by Americans. Three, and possibly four, had wounds received from hand grenades exploded by comrades in suicide attempts. Three had similar fresh wounds over the laryngeal eminence which were believed to be self-inflicted. One gangrenous toe was amputated. All wounds were dressed.

5. The prisoners were evacuated to the U.S.S. PRESIDENT POLK and this ship was redesignated as a casualty carrier. No Penicillin was carried on board and as casualties came on board an attempt was made to secure Penicillin. Approximately 8 million units were secured from other ships. This proved to be inadequate and an additional 2 million units obtained from various ships at Eniwetok also was insufficient to treat the number of cases in which it appeared desirable. Penicillin was used principally: (a) in patients with large infected wounds in conjunction with a sulfa drug; (b) infected hemothorax; (c) such cases as did not appear to respond to sulfa drugs; (d) cases allergic to sulfa; (e) gas gangrene.

6. Approximately twenty (20) transfusions were given by crew members. One case of gas gangrene required amputation at the mid thigh. One case of gangrene of the foot required amputation at the upper 1/3 of the lower leg. This was due to severed vessels just below the knee.

7. Before departure several fresh casualties were received from the beach. Among these was a gunshot wound of the abdomen requiring immediate laparotomy and two perforations of the upper jejunum were sutured.

8. Many serious eye injuries were received, two of which were so badly lacerated that evisceration was done with removal of the entire ciliary body. Seven eye cases, including two severe infections not casualties, were evacuated from the ship to the hospital at Eniwetok.

9. Three deceased members of ship's company were received on board, identified, and returned to the Graves Registration Service ashore, for burial.

10. The medical beach party was ashore from D day to D plus 3. It consisted of the ship's junior medical officer and eight corpsmen. They handled casualties and evacuated them to the LST. The beach party medical officer's report is attached.

11. Two ship's medical officers and two corpsmen were furnished the LST on D day for care of casualties brought from the beach. In response to a call for additional corpsmen, six more were sent to the LST on D plus 1. Both groups returned to this ship before departure from the area.

12. Additional supplies sent to the beach included 100 litter units, 125 plasma units, and approximately 500 battle dressings and compresses. These were requested by the beach on two different occasions.

13. Sulfadiazene and Vitamin K were given all members of ship's company who went ashore or in the boats.

14. Contrary to previous order, skintight plaster casts were not cut when applied, and many such cases were evacuated to this ship from others where it had been applied. Many casts required hours to cut. This would have been avoided by a few minutes work while the plaster was wet.

15. On board, the most serious cases were kept in the sick bay on the main deck. Slightly less serious bed cases were placed in the troop officers' quarters. Ambulatory patients were located in troop quarters aft which was the coolest available location.

16. There are two material handicaps in handling casualties on this ship. These are: (1) Lack of adequate fresh air in the sick bay and in the troop officers' quarters and (2) Lack of free passageway to carry stretcher patients to the troop officers' quarters. An opening had previously been made in number 4 hatch and stretcher patients were lowered by hand and passed through this opening. This condition could be corrected by widening ladder #13 and creating a door leading into the troop officers' quarters. Corrections to be made at next availability.

17. Casualties received and their disposition is shown on enclosure (C).

W.L. KELSEY,
LtCdr MC-V(8), USNR
Senior Medical Officer

REPORT OF BEACH PARTY MEDICAL OFFICER

1. The ORMSBY medical beach party reached shore on White Beach Two at approximately 1100, 21 July 1944. They were relieved at 1400, 23 July 1944. During this time they evacuated a total of 145 casualties, consisting of 77 stretcher and 68 ambulatory patients. During the first 24 hours, all seriously injured were evacuated to LST446. All other casualties received on this beach were evacuated via LVT's to the reef for further transfer to the transports. All casualties were received from the first aid station in good condition for evacuation and additional first aid was necessary in only a few instances. With the close cooperation of the LVT's immediate evacuation was possible for all casualties. No deaths occurred among the casualties received.

C.L. FRANK,
Lt(jg) MC-V(8), USNR,
Beach Medical Officer.

COMMENTS OF COMMUNICATION OFFICER

1. During this operation our communication personnel and equipment functioned smoothly and efficiently, contributing an important part in another successful phase of the ship's career. Contact with all stations on the required nets was established and maintained without failure of equipment except for SCR 610 batteries which were replaced promptly from an adequate supply.

2. Due to the ship's outlying position during the attack phase, it was impossible to make the maximum use of visual contact with the beach; however for intership traffic, a concerted effort was made to reduce radio transmissions by employing visual means.

3. For rapid voice radio communication and boat control the SCR 608/610 equipment again proved to be the best we have used. This opinion was evidently shared throughout the group, and unfortunately, caused the virtual abandonment of the more cumbersome TBX ship-shore administrative circuit resulting in greatly overloading the boat control net. As would be expected on a crowded voice circuit there was considerable confusion, delay in transmitting important traffic, and almost complete disregard for procedure and discipline.

4. Unnecessary traffic on the TBS maneuvering circuit was held to a minimum. This is in sharp contrast to conditions existing during operations a year ago and constitutes a major improvement in operational communications. The assignment of an SCR 608 maneuvering frequency to each group to parallel the TBS during the cruising phase when several groups are within TBS range is an excellent idea and should be considered for inclusion in future plans.

5. Two worthy innovations were included in the plan for this operation:

(a) The pocket size communication manual containing important excerpts from the major plan, much valuable time was saved by its availability for ready reference:

(b) The distribution of printed scrambled alphabets for the shackie code with daily tables already filled in. This was the best possible insurance against confusion resulting from error in making up the daily code.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) More rigid supervision of boat control net and enforced use of ship-shore net for administrative traffic.

(2) During exercises prior to the operation, designate a

discrepancy watch on voice circuits. The net control may give this duty to a different ship each exercise and noted errors can be discussed at subsequent conferences.

CONCLUSION:

It is the communication officers opinion that the communication plan employed by Task Force 53 in the recent operation was the most compact and adaptable of any used by this ship. Sufficient circuits were assigned to adequately handle the traffic yet there were few enough to be conveniently manned by available personnel.

A.H. DARLING,
Lt C-V(G) USNR
Communication Officer

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Enclosure (D)

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